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SUPERVISORY LIABILITY POST-IQBAL: A “MISNOMER”
INDEED
Desiree L. Grace

I.

*

INTRODUCTION
1

The Supreme Court’s blockbuster decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
has generated enormous scholarly interest and, within just ten
months of being decided, became the seventy-sixth most cited Su2
preme Court case of all time. Yet, academic attention has focused
primarily on whether the Court’s imposition of a “plausibility” pleading standard substantially altered the traditionally liberal pleading
3
standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Scholars have
paid far less attention to another important—and potentially confusing—impact of the decision: whether it fundamentally changed the
standards for alleging “supervisory liability” against high-level government officials.
As a result of some arguably broad language in the majority opinion, as well as suggestions by Justice Souter in his dissenting opinion, some courts have interpreted Iqbal as holding that supervisors
are not liable for their mere “knowledge and acquiescence” in their
subordinates’ conduct, and that consequently, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the supervisor himself personally engaged in the chal-

*

J.D. Candidate, 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., cum laude,
2009, University of Maryland. I would like to thank Dan McGrady, Jeff Mongiello,
and Rebecca Garibotto for their suggestions and edits. I would also like to thank Eric Latzer for his input and his support, and I would like to thank my family for their
love and assistance. Lastly, I would like to thank Professor Baher Azmy for his thorough feedback, his invaluable teaching, and his ongoing guidance throughout the
past few years.
1
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1359 (2010)
(noting that as of March 17, 2010, federal courts and tribunals had cited Ashcroft v.
Iqbal 6,620 times).
3
E.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Edward A. Hartnett, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 473 (2010); Lee H. Rosenthal, Pleading, for the Future: Conversations After Iqbal,
114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1537 (2010); Steinman, supra note 2.
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4

lenged conduct. Such an interpretation would create a dramatic
shift in the law of supervisory liability, as cases previously brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have suggested that supervisors could be held
liable upon proof of something short of personal direction or direct
5
involvement.
Other courts and some early commentators suggest a more restrained reading of Iqbal. This narrower interpretation suggests that
Iqbal’s ruling should be limited to its facts: “knowledge and acquiescence” is insufficient to satisfy supervisory liability in situations where
the substantive cause of action requires proof of discriminatory in6
tent. Fundamentally, this limited reading indicates that the requisite
showing for a supervisory liability claim varies depending on the type
of underlying constitutional violation alleged.
In this Comment, I seek to resolve the confusion among these
competing interpretations, and offer a more coherent and durable

4

See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010); Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1227 n.3 (10th
Cir. 2010).
5
See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that
local governing bodies can be liable where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers”); Preschooler II v.
Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007) ( “[A] supervisor is
liable for the acts of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the
violations, or knew of the violations [of subordinates] and failed to act to prevent
them.”) (internal citations omitted); Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146,
1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he plaintiff must establish a deliberate, intentional act by
the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.”) (internal citations omitted); Estate of
Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (allowing supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise); Ottman v. City of Indep., 341 F.3d 751,
761 (8th Cir. 2003) (imposing liability “when the supervisor’s corrective inaction
constitutes deliberate indifference toward the violation”); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that a supervisor may be liable upon a showing
of “a history of widespread abuse [that] puts the responsible supervisor on notice of
the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so”); Doe v. City of
Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that in order to hold supervisory
defendants liable, plaintiff must show that the defendants’ conduct amounted to deliberate indifference or, put differently, “to a tacit authorization of the abuse”);
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) (allowing supervisory
liability on a failure to train claim when “the need for more or different training was
so obvious and so likely to lead to the violation of constitutional rights that the policymaker’s failure to respond amounts to deliberate indifference”); O’Neill v. Baker,
210 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that supervisory liability requires the plaintiff
to “show that the supervisor possessed either the state of mind for the particular constitutional violation or deliberate indifference, and . . . played a causal role in plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation”) (internal citations omitted).
6
See, e.g., Starr v. Baca, No. 09-55233, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15283, at *10–11
(9th Cir. July 25, 2011); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1204 (10th Cir. 2010).
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theory of pleading supervisory liability. Part II of this Comment will
discuss the Iqbal opinion and provide a general overview of the concept of supervisory liability and its relationship to the doctrine of
qualified immunity. It will then consider the various interpretations
of the Iqbal opinion and analyze the policy implications and practical
considerations resulting from each approach. Next, based on both
the language of the Iqbal opinion and the context in which the decision was made, Part III will conclude that the ruling on the scope of
supervisory liability was limited and could not have categorically abolished the concept of supervisory liability. Finally, Part IV will analyze pre-Iqbal case law in conjunction with the Iqbal holding to suggest
a clarified, two-prong standard. Specifically, prong one is a requisite
personal involvement and prong two is a requisite mental state associated with the particular cause of action asserted.
In sum, this Comment will argue that the Iqbal decision did not
alter the requirement that government officials must be personally
involved; it simply reiterated this requirement by stating that officials
7
are only liable “for their own misconduct.” Additionally, this Comment concludes that the decision did alter the obligation to plead
facts relevant to the state-of-mind required for the particular cause of
action. Knowledge of a subordinate’s misconduct and an unreasonable or reckless reaction to that misconduct will no longer be sufficient in every situation. Rather, the official’s mental state will vary, as
it must reflect the level of intent required by the underlying violation.
II. IQBAL, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AND CONFUSION OVER STANDARDS OF
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
A. The Iqbal Decision.
As noted, attorneys and scholars cite Ashcroft v. Iqbal primarily for
8
its language pertaining to pleading standards. Iqbal involved a Bi9
vens action against several high-level federal officials, including the
former Attorney General of the United States and the former Direc10
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). A central dispute
7

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
See, e.g., Bone, supra note 3; Rosenthal, supra note 3.
9
A Bivens action is the federal analog to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see infra text accompanying notes 21–26. Section 1983 gives plaintiffs the right to sue state government officials in their individual capacity for their official actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Bivens creates a parallel cause of action for claims against federal officials. Bivens, 403
U.S. 388.
10
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.
8

GRACE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

320

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/9/2012 5:22 PM

[Vol. 42:317
11

in Iqbal pertained to the standard for supervisory liability. Supervisory liability centers on instances where courts hold high-level government officials liable for their subordinates’ actions. The law is
12
clear that there is no respondeat superior liability, but the law is un13
clear as to the point at which supervisors assume responsibility.
Javaid Iqbal was a Muslim, Pakistani citizen arrested in the United States on November 2, 2001—shortly after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks—on criminal charges of conspiracy to defraud the
14
United States and fraud with identification. After approximately
two months of incarceration at the Metropolitan Detention Center in
15
Brooklyn (MDC), Iqbal was moved from general population to the
Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit as a result of being
designated a person “of high interest” in the September 11th investi16
gations. Iqbal alleged that he was deprived of various constitutional
protections, including his First and Fifth Amendment rights, and
17
brought suit against an extensive list of defendants. Specifically, Iq18
bal brought the action against members of the MDC staff, officials
from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), officials from the FBI, and the At19
torney General.
In his suit against these high-level officials, Iqbal alleged that the
FBI arrested and detained thousands of Muslims during the September 11th investigations, and that many of these arrestees and detainees were classified as “high interest” solely on the basis of their race,
20
religion, or national origin. A designation “of high interest” allegedly had a direct effect on the duration and conditions of an arres-

11

See id.
Respondeat superior is “the doctrine holding an employer or principal liable
for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2008).
13
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
14
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007).
15
“General population” refers to the environment in prison where a prisoner has
access to other inmates. See Julia Dahl, Is It Time to Ban Solitary Confinement?, CRIME
REP. (Oct. 12, 2009), http://thecrimereport.org/2009/10/12/is-it-time-to-bansolitary-confinement/#. Contrast this to solitary confinement where a prisoner is
kept in isolation from other prisoners and is locked in his or her cell for up to twenty-three hours per day. Id.
16
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 148.
17
Id. at 147.
18
Dennis Hasty, the first named defendant, was the former warden of the MDC
where Iqbal was detained.
19
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 147.
20
Id. at 148.
12
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21

tee’s detention. The Supreme Court’s decision dealt only with petitioners John Ashcroft, the Attorney General of the United States at
the time of Iqbal’s arrest and detention, and Robert Mueller, the
22
then-Director of the FBI. Iqbal claimed that these defendants implemented an unconstitutional policy that caused him to endure
harsh conditions of confinement solely because of his race, religion,
23
or national origin. Iqbal asserted that “Ashcroft was the policy’s
‘principal architect’ and Mueller was ‘instrumental’ in its adoption
24
and execution.”
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York denied Ashcroft and Mueller’s motion to dismiss Iqbal’s discrimination claim based on a defense of qualified immunity, and the
25
court of appeals affirmed. Ashcroft and Mueller petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court seeking clarification of their personal
liability for constitutional violations that their subordinates allegedly
26
caused.
27
Iqbal brought his claims as a Bivens action. Bivens claims are
the federal analog to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, which are brought un28
der state law. A § 1983 action is a claim for damages against a state
government official in his or her individual capacity for alleged viola29
tions of constitutional rights. The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
states:
Every person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .30

A Bivens action, then, is a claim for damages against federal officials in their individual capacity for alleged violations of constitution21

Id.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
23
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 13:69, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft,
No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), ECF No. 35
[hereinafter Elmaghraby First Amended Complaint].
24
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1939.
25
Elmaghraby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *114.
26
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
(No. 07-1015).
27
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943.
28
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
29
Id.
30
Id.
22
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31

al rights. Neither a § 1983 claim nor a Bivens action can succeed on
a theory of vicarious liability; the Supreme Court has rejected a
32
theory of respondeat superior to hold government officials liable.
As a result, the majority opinion in Iqbal concluded that “[a] plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
33
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” The
Court explained that the requisite showing for a Bivens violation “will
34
vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” Therefore, as an example, an analysis of a Fourth Amendment violation should differ
from that of an Eighth Amendment violation. In Iqbal, the alleged
constitutional violations were those of the First and Fifth Amend35
ments. In an effort to clarify the ruling regarding the volatility of
Bivens analyses and to apply the Bivens standard to the Iqbal facts, the
Supreme Court specified that “[w]here the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the de36
fendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”
B. Basic Principles of Supervisory Liability and Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of supervisory liability is relevant in the public sector in situations in which an individual suffers a violation of a constitutionally protected right and seeks to hold those government offi37
cials who are responsible for the violation personally liable. The law
is clear that there is no respondeat superior in the context of supervi38
sory liability, but jurisdictions are split as to when liability attaches to
39
a supervisor. Supervisory liability exists in order to provide high31

See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–67 (2001) (citing Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971)).
32
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
33
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
34
Id.
35
Elmaghraby First Amended Complaint, supra note 23.
36
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (emphasis added).
37
See generally Sheldon Nahmod, Pondering Iqbal: Constitutional Torts, OverDeterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279 (2010)
(explaining the basic foundation of supervisory liability, arguing that the Iqbal decision was the result of the Court’s increasing concern with over-deterrence, and advocating for the constitutional approach for Bivens and § 1983 cases).
38
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
39
See, e.g., Allen v. Heinzle, 351 F. App’x 145, 146 (7th Cir. 2009) (requiring control over the situation and deliberate indifference); Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583
F.3d 522, 538 (7th Cir. 2009) (indicating that liability would be permissible for
promulgating a policy that required or encouraged the violation of inmates’ rights);
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that, in some
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level officials with the incentive to prevent and eliminate misconduct
40
by their subordinates. Likewise, it provides a means of compensa41
tion for the victims of misconduct.
While, in some circumstances, tort law recognizes that supervi42
sors may be held vicariously liable for their subordinates’ conduct,
courts have long held that it does not make sense to extend vicarious
43
liability to government employment situations. This stems from the
need for government officials to perform their duties without the dis44
traction of potential liability. Because of this preference for permitting government officials to make sweeping policy decisions without
fear of personal liability, the doctrine of qualified immunity exists as
45
another measure of protection.
When supervisory officials are sued under a § 1983 or Bivens ac46
tion, they will commonly assert the qualified immunity defense. A
claim of qualified immunity is essentially an argument that, despite
the existence of a constitutional violation, the government official
should not be held liable in his or her individual capacity for that violation because he or she was acting reasonably and pursuant to his

circumstances, liability is permissible for failure to train, supervise, or hire appropriately).
40
See generally Kit Kinports, Iqbal and Supervisory Immunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
1291 (2010).
41
Id.
42
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 69–70, at 499–505
(5th ed. 1984) (citing Talbot Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem,
38 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1940)) (stating that a supervisor’s “vicarious liability, for conduct which is in no way his own, extends to any and all tortious conduct of the servant which is within the ‘scope of the employment’” and subsequently explaining the
circumstances that fall within the “scope of employment” ambit).
43
See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
44
George D. Brown, Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via Lawsuit—The Bivens Impasse, 82
S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 876 (2009) (“Immunity protects the official from the burden of
litigation and also furthers the government’s interest in having zealous officials.”); see
also Kinports, supra note 40, at 1295.
45
Nahmod, supra note 37, at 286.
46
Id.; Brown, supra note 44, at 875 (asserting that the qualified immunity defense
is one of the two most prominent defenses); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 809, 812 (2010) (suggesting that the lack of success of Bivens litigation is due, in
part, to the fact that “Bivens plaintiffs are disadvantaged because the personal defense of qualified immunity is an imposing barrier to recovery from federal officers”)
(internal citations omitted); William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort
Liability of Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 1105, 1143 (1996) (“Since the 1980s, it has become very difficult for plaintiffs
. . . to win a Bivens case.”); see also id. at 1152, 1164–65.
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47

or her official role. The purpose of the qualified immunity defense
is to “shield [government officials] from undue interference with
48
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” As a
result, the Court has said that “high officials require greater protec49
tion than those with less complex discretionary responsibilities.”
One prominent benefit of this defense is that qualified immunity is a
shield from the burdens of discovery and the costs of litigation, not
50
just a shield from liability.
Assessing the defense of qualified immunity typically requires a
51
bifurcated inquiry. The first part of the inquiry is whether a consti52
tutional violation has actually occurred. Second, upon finding that
a constitutional violation has occurred, the court must then determine whether the violated constitutional right was “clearly estab53
lished” at the time of the government official’s misconduct. Prior to
2009, district courts were required to address these questions in this
54
order. This meant that there could be a threshold finding of a con55
stitutional violation, even if the official could not be held liable. In
Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court concluded that district courts
can choose to conduct the qualified immunity analysis in any order
56
they wish. So, if a court finds it easier to rule that the right was not
clearly established, it can do so without ruling on whether a constitu57
Conversely, even if the court
tional violation actually occurred.
finds that there was a constitutional violation, the government defendant is still entitled to qualified immunity if the right was not “clearly
58
established” at that time.
47

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
Id.; accord Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“Qualified immunity
balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”).
49
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
50
Id. at 817; see also Brown, supra note 44, at 876 (“Immunity, if upheld, stops litigation at an early stage.”).
51
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
52
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815–16.
53
Id. at 816; accord Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1988).
54
See generally Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808.
55
See id.
56
Id. at 818.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 818–19. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.6, at
548–57 (5th ed. 2007) (analyzing the doctrine of qualified immunity, the practical
application of the Harlow test, and current issues with determining when a right is
“clearly established”).
48
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In Iqbal, the Court collapsed the qualified immunity inquiry into
59
the supervisory liability analysis. Under the Court’s view, a supervisor does not violate a “clearly established” constitutional right if the
60
supervisor is not personally responsible for the violation. In conflating these two analyses, the Court provided additional protections for
the discretionary decisions that supervisory officials made; the Court
likely did so for the same policy reasons that the qualified immunity
61
defense was put in place. Uncertainty about the scope of supervisory liability is problematic for both plaintiffs and defendants alike.
Government officials need clear rules about the scope of their supervisory responsibilities in order to avoid becoming overly cautious in
62
the administration of their duties. At the same time, plaintiffs need
to know how to plead and prove allegations against supervisors who,
they believe, may be responsible for their constitutional injury.
In sum, a coherent standard for supervisory liability is necessary
because vicarious liability does not exist for government officials.
While it is essential to provide government officials with protections
that allow them to do their jobs properly, they must nonetheless have
incentives to protect individuals’ constitutional rights.
C. Various Interpretations of the Iqbal Decision
Following the Iqbal decision, circuit courts have expressed uncer63
tainty about the appropriate standard for supervisory liability. Sev64
eral interpretations have emerged. One is that Iqbal eliminated su-

59

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
In the context of determining whether there is a violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than
knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for
unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official
charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities.

Id.
60

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 40–45.
62
Nahmod, supra note 37, at 286 (“The primary policy concern is that the functions performed are so very important that we do not want this defendant—often
high profile—to be worried about the possibility of being sued rather than focusing
on making the difficult decisions that he or she is supposed to make.”).
63
See, e.g., Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5
(3d Cir. 2009) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, it
is uncertain whether proof of such personal knowledge, with nothing more, would
provide a sufficient basis for holding . . . [the supervisory official] liable.”) (internal
citations omitted).
64
See infra text accompanying notes 75–109.
61
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65

pervisory liability entirely. An alternative interpretation is that Iqbal
might now require plaintiffs to prove that the supervisors purposely
intended to cause the constitutional violation, rather than permit any
lesser standard such as unreasonableness, negligence, or reckless66
ness. Another related interpretation is that Iqbal is a limited ruling
that applies only to intent-based claims or to situations involving ex67
igent circumstances and national security concerns.
As previously addressed, the current state of supervisory liability
is unclear as courts have been uncertain regarding the Iqbal decision’s substance and scope. Several circuit courts have noted in dicta
that Iqbal might have altered the standard for all supervisory liability
68
claims. In nearly all of these cases, though, the circuit courts have
69
ruled on narrower grounds and have opted to refrain from making

65

Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1227 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010).
See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 992 n.13 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“It is doubtful that the majority’s ‘knowing failure to act’ standard survived Iqbal.”).
67
For such an interpretation of Iqbal, see Nahmod, supra note 37.
68
See Lewis, 604 F.3d at 1227 n.3 (“[Iqbal] has generated significant debate about
the continuing vitality and scope of supervisory liability not only in Bivens actions, but
also in § 1983 suits like the one before us.”).
At one end of the spectrum, the Iqbal dissenters seemed to believe that
the majority opinion ‘eliminates . . . supervisory liability entirely . . . .
At the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit has read Iqbal as
possibly holding that ‘purpose . . . is required’ merely in cases of alleged racial discrimination by government officials, given that Iqbal itself involved allegations of racial discrimination and such discrimination only violates the Constitution when it is intentional.
Id.; see also Arocho v. Nafziger, 367 F. App’x 942, 947 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
basic concept of § 1983 or Bivens supervisory liability itself may no longer be tenable.”); Bayer, 577 F.3d at 190 n.5 (“In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of such personal knowledge, with nothing more, would provide a sufficient basis for holding . . . [the supervisory official]
liable.”) (internal citations omitted); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 274 n.7
(1st Cir. 2009) (“Some recent language from the Supreme Court may call into question our prior circuit law on the standard for holding a public official liable for damages under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability.”).
69
Only the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have actually interpreted the Iqbal decision
regarding the standard for supervisory liability. See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d
1185 (10th Cir. 2010); Starr v. Baca, No. 09-55233, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15283, at
*10–11 (9th Cir. July 25, 2011).
A plaintiff may . . . succeed in a § 1983 suit against a defendantsupervisor by demonstrating: (1) the defendant promulgated, created,
implemented, or possessed responsibility for the continued operation
of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and
(3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199.
66
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broad pronouncements that Iqbal in fact eliminated the possibility of
70
supervisory liability.
In general, despite the seemingly clear language of Iqbal, lower courts have been confused as to how broad the
71
scope of the ruling was. This uncertainty is perhaps attributable to
the rhetoric of Justice Souter’s passionate dissent. Souter wrote, “Lest
there be any mistake, in these words the majority is not narrowing the
scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liabil72
ity entirely.” He continued, “The nature of a supervisory liability
theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under certain conditions,
for the wrongdoing of his subordinates, and it is this very principle
73
that the majority rejects.” Justice Souter then criticized the majority
for allegedly allowing only two outcomes with the standard for supervisory liability: (1) respondeat superior, or (2) no supervisory liability
74
at all. This rhetoric may be responsible for the confusion regarding
the substance and scope of the majority opinion.
One interpretation of the scope of Iqbal—the view articulated by
75
Justice Souter—is that Iqbal eliminated supervisory liability entirely.
This interpretation is derived, in part, from the language in the deci76
sion stating that “supervisory liability is a misnomer.” Some commentators have understood this statement to mean that supervisory
liability no longer exists as a distinct concept; rather, supervisors now
77
must meet the same requirements as the subordinate. The majority
opinion also explains that the supervisor must be personally involved
in the alleged constitutional violation and that mere knowledge is in70
See, e.g., Lewis, 604 F.3d 1221; Arocho, 367 F. App’x 942; al-Kidd, 580 F.3d 949;
Bayer, 577 F.3d 186; Maldonado, 568 F.3d 263. For articles outlining the confusion in
the wake of the Iqbal decision, see Michael Dorf, Pondering Iqbal: Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217; Kinports, supra note 40; Nahmod, supra note 37;
Victor Romero, Interrogating Iqbal: Intent, Inertia, and (a lack of) Imagination, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1419 (2010).
71
See, e.g., Castellar v. Caporale, No. CV-04-3402, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91191
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010).
72
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1958.
75
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30–31, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d
949 (2010) (arguing that Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred because Iqbal
held that government officials may never be personally liable for misconduct of subordinate officials); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Lest there be any
mistake, in these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”).
76
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
77
See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Iqbal III: The Death of Supervisory Liability,
PRAWFSBLAWG (May 19, 2009, 7:38 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2009/05/iqbal-iii-the-death-of-supervisory-liability.html.
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78

sufficient to hold the supervisor liable. This first interpretation is
derived from the opinion’s language—taken in the abstract and out
of context—without the particularized application of these state79
ments to the specific constitutional violations alleged in the case.
According to proponents of this view, there is no supervisory liability, but rather, a supervisor is only liable if that supervisor directly
80
participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. Because there
is undisputedly no respondeat superior liability for government offi81
cials, this interpretation of Iqbal suggests that supervisors can never
be held liable for the conduct of their subordinates—that supervisory
82
liability is dead.
The second interpretation of Iqbal’s supervisory liability standard
is far narrower. Under this interpretation, supervisors can be liable
for their subordinates’ constitutional violations only upon a showing
of intent to cause such violations, regardless of the basis for the un83
derlying claim. This interpretation stems from the fact that in Iqbal,
the Court required a showing of purpose or intent for the allegations
84
of First and Fifth Amendment violations. Under this interpretation
of Iqbal, a supervisor would be liable if he or she directly instructed a
subordinate to commit an act that violated an individual’s constitutional rights, so long as the plaintiff could prove that the supervisor
85
had the intention for such a result to occur.
In line with the previous suggestion, a third interpretation is that
the Iqbal ruling, requiring a showing of purpose or intent, was limited
to those situations in which the underlying violation is an intent78

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
For an example of this interpretation, see Wasserman, supra note 77.
80
Id. In a case raising this very issue, the government argued that high level supervisory officials of ICE—sued for an alleged pattern and practice of unconstitutional home raids on immigrants—could only be liable if they themselves “directly
planned or participated” in the underlying raids at issue. They rejected plaintiffs’
proposed theory that those high level officials could be held liable for their knowledge of, and acquiescence in, the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates.
Brief for Appellants at 24, 31, Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
No. 10-1479 (3d Cir. Oct. 6, 2010), ECF No. 003110306015.
81
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
82
See Wasserman, supra note 77.
83
See, e.g., Individual Federal Defendants Myers, Torres, Weber, and Rodriquez’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 20–21, Argueta v. U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 08-1652 (D.N.J. June 18, 2009), ECF No.
108 [hereinafter Individual Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss] (“An allegation
of ‘mere knowledge,’ however, is not enough to hold a supervisor personally liable in
a Bivens action.”).
84
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
85
See Individual Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 20–21.
79

GRACE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/9/2012 5:22 PM

COMMENT

329

86

based claim. Under this interpretation, the required mental state of
the supervisor will mirror that of the subordinate and will be derived
87
from the underlying constitutional claim. With this understanding,
claimants for Eighth Amendment violations or Fourth Amendment
violations need not show purpose or intent. Rather, they must satisfy
each amendment’s mental state—namely, recklessness and objective
88
unreasonableness, respectively.
For clarification of the various interpretations, consider a hypothetical: there are three officials: (1) a patrol officer, (2) a superior
officer, and (3) a chief officer. The superior officer sees his subordinate patrol officer searching the passenger compartment of every car
pulled over for a traffic violation. The superior officer does not intervene. The chief officer hears that this type of conduct is occurring
but fails to investigate or remedy any wrongdoing. Assume for the
sake of the hypothetical that the patrolman’s search violates the driver’s clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment, and that
a reasonable officer would have known that he or she was violating
the individual’s constitutional rights; accordingly, the patrolman
89
would not be entitled to the qualified immunity defense.
Applying the first interpretation—that supervisory liability is abolished—only the patrol officer who actually conducted the unlawful
search of the individual’s passenger compartment during the traffic
stop would be liable under a § 1983 or Bivens action. The superior
officer would not be liable because his failure to intervene would be
insufficient to satisfy the heightened supervisory liability standard.
The same rationale applies to the chief officer who merely heard that
the unconstitutional conduct was occurring. The lack of direct involvement would shield the supervisory defendants from liability under this interpretation even when the plaintiff’s right to be free from
the patrolman’s search is clearly established.

86
See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Individual Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration at 3–4, Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, No. 08-1652 (D.N.J. June 22, 2009), ECF No. 109 (explaining that Iqbal
logically required intent or purpose for supervisors because it is “hornbook law that,
in order to state a claim for racial discrimination . . . or religious discrimination . . . a
plaintiff must prove that the relevant decision-maker discriminated specifically on
the basis of race or religion—i.e. with an invidious purpose or mindset”). Thus, the
requirement of purpose or intent in Iqbal was derived from the underlying constitutional claim and not from the defendant’s status as a supervisor. Id.
87
See id.
88
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994); U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
89
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
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Applying the second interpretation—that purpose or intent is
required regardless of the underlying violation—the patrol officer
would be liable for actually conducting the unlawful search that violated the driver’s constitutional rights. In addition, the superior officer could be liable if the choice not to intervene was subjectively
motivated by his intent to violate the driver’s rights. Likewise, the
chief officer would be liable only if the plaintiff could present evidence that the chief officer failed to respond to the concerns about
which he knew because the chief officer intended for third parties to
90
endure violations of their constitutional rights.
Lastly, recall that the third interpretation requires a showing of
the mental state mandated by the underlying violation. Because this
is a Fourth Amendment violation, the mental state would need to re91
flect the underlying requirement of objective unreasonableness.
Applying this interpretation to the hypothetical, the patrol officer
would be liable for actually conducting the unlawful search that
caused the constitutional violation. Additionally, the superior officer
would be liable for failing to intervene and stop his subordinate from
causing the constitutional violation because this would be objectively
unreasonable. To satisfy the personal involvement requirement for a
Fourth Amendment claim, the standard of knowledge and acquies92
cence would be permissible. If a court applied that standard, the
chief officer would likely be liable because he was aware of the constitutional violations and acquiesced in that behavior through his failure to act and train his subordinates to refrain from engaging in such
conduct. His personal liability would be permissible if his failure to
act was objectively unreasonable.
The final interpretation of the Iqbal decision is that the holding
is limited to the exigent circumstances surrounding Ashcroft and
93
Mueller’s policy decisions. Ashcroft argued that national security
interests should be relevant to the Court’s decision regarding his

90

Holding the supervisors liable in this type of situation, while relatively simple
in theory, would be exceedingly difficult in practice. This is, in large part, due to the
Iqbal decision pertaining to the pleading standard. While not the focus of this Comment, the Iqbal Court’s holding that allegations that are merely conclusory do not
merit the presumption of truth that factual allegations receive in a motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
91
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
92
See discussion Part V infra.
93
See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 37; Steinman, supra note 2, at 1326 (referring to
Iqbal as an “exceptional” case).
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qualified immunity. In order to understand the basis for suggesting
such an interpretation, it is essential to detail the national security
situation that Ashcroft and Mueller faced. The record showed that
after the attacks on September 11th, the Department of Justice initiated an extensive investigation in an attempt to apprehend those
95
responsible. Over 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel
were involved in this initiative, and within one week, the FBI had
96
96,000 potential leads. In response to this situation, the FBI questioned over 1,000 potential suspects regarding the attacks and terror97
ism generally. Out of the 1,000 initially questioned, “762 were held
on immigration charges . . . and a 184-member subset of that group
98
was deemed to be of high interest to the investigation.” Those who
were designated as “high interest” suspects were imprisoned in such a
manner so as to eliminate the potential for communication with oth99
er suspected terrorists.
Ashcroft argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity and
urged the district court to dismiss his claims given the “unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
100
United States.” Although both lower courts rejected this argument,
one can argue that the Supreme Court considered it a pertinent factor in reversing the lower courts’ decisions. After all, Judge Cabranes’s concurring opinion from the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reflected a general concern for subjecting high-level
government officials to liability for decisions made regarding national
101
security. Judge Cabranes articulated the need for additional leeway
because society does not want the most qualified individuals to reject
102
high-level positions due to fear of personal liability. Likewise, socie-

94

Motion to Dismiss the Claims Against Attorney General John Ashcroft in His
Individual Capacity at 5, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21434 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)(No. 04-CV-1809)[hereinafter Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Ashcroft].
95
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1, 11–12 (2003)).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
99
Id.
100
Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Ashcroft, supra note 94 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)).
101
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, C.J., concurring).
102
Id.
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ty does not benefit from deterring supervisory officials from making
103
certain controversial decisions because of this same fear.
In sum, Judge Cabranes conceded that the majority’s “discussion
of the relevant pleading standards reflect[ed] the uneasy compromise . . . between a qualified immunity privilege rooted in the need to
preserve the effectiveness of government . . . and the pleading re104
quirements” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Notwithstanding his agreement that it was an uneasy compromise, he was concerned with the potential for “subjecting high-ranking Government
officials—entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity and
charged with responding to ‘a national and international security
emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic’—to the burdens of discovery on the basis of a complaint as non105
specific as respondent’s.”
Because of this serious concern, Judge
106
Cabranes passionately urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
The Supreme Court endorsed Judge Cabranes’s perspective as the
Court quoted his language—referenced above—twice in the majority
107
opinion.
III. THE MOST PLAUSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE IQBAL DECISION
As a matter of policy, courts should reject both the interpretation that Iqbal entirely abolishes supervisory liability and the interpretation that Iqbal now requires a showing of purpose or intent to cause
the constitutional violation regardless of the underlying violation. In
rejecting the interpretation that Iqbal entirely eliminated supervisory
liability, it is important to note that the foundation for permitting §
1983 or Bivens claims against government officials for their constitu108
tional violations is derived from public policy. The scope of supervisory liability and qualified immunity is determined by balancing the
societal interests “of deterring constitutional misconduct and compensating those whose rights have been violated” on the one hand,
and “the governmental interest in ensuring that public officials are
not unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties” on the oth-

103

Id.
Id. at 178 (internal quotations omitted).
105
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945 (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 179).
106
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 178 (“[I]t is worth underscoring that some of those precedents are less than crystal clear and fully deserve reconsideration by the Supreme
Court at the earliest opportunity; to say the least, the guidance they provide is not
readily harmonized.”) (internal quotations omitted).
107
Id.
108
Kinports, supra note 40, at 1291–92.
104
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109

er. In order to accomplish the goals of deterring future violations
and compensating victims, a standard exists for holding supervisors
110
liable.
Supervisors are in a unique position that includes “the power
and resources required to implement the reforms necessary to curb
111
additional wrongdoing.”
As an incentive to eliminate future viola112
tions, supervisors are exposed to liability.
In order to protect the
government’s interest in preserving the officials’ abilities to perform
their duties and avoid situations in which officials are distracted from
their duties, society limits that exposure with the doctrine of qualified
113
immunity.
This policy objective is consistent with the modern Supreme
Court interpretations of supervisory liability under § 1983 and is also
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens to extend this
114
exposure to liability to federal officials. It is highly unlikely that the
Iqbal Court intended to eliminate 140 years of § 1983 case law and
nearly forty years of Bivens case law in three short paragraphs. Also,
115
the language of § 1983 indicates an intention that liability of supervisors apply in more situations than just those in which the supervisor
directly causes the violation himself or herself. Section 1983 clearly
states that any official is liable if he or she “subjects, or causes to be
116
subjected” any citizen to the deprivation of constitutional rights.
Causing a citizen to be subjected to constitutional violations does not
necessarily entail directly subjecting the citizen to the violation. If it
abolished supervisory liability entirely, the Court, as a practical matter, would create absolute immunity for government officials. Under
this approach, supervisors could avoid liability even when they directly instruct subordinates to cause constitutional violations.
In addition to rejecting the interpretation that supervisory liability is entirely eliminated, courts should also reject the interpretation
that, post-Iqbal, all Bivens claims require a showing of purpose or in-

109

Id. at 1292.
See id.
111
Id. at 1299.
112
Id. at 1300–02.
113
See id. at 1301.
114
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 288, 391 (1971).
115
“Every person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen . . . or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006) (emphasis added).
116
Id. (emphasis added).
110
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tent. Under a thorough analysis of the Iqbal decision, both the language of the opinion and the context in which the decision was made
indicate that the ruling on the scope of supervisory liability was limited, and it did not eliminate all Bivens claims that lack a showing of
purpose or intent.
A. The Context of the Iqbal Ruling
To understand the Iqbal ruling, it is necessary to consider the issue regarding supervisory liability that was actually before the Supreme Court. According to the petition for certiorari, the issue was
[w]hether a cabinet-level officer or other high ranking official
may be held personally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional
acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination alleged117
ly carried out by such subordinate officials.

The scope of supervisory liability was not before the Court because the defendants did not contest the plaintiff’s suggested stan118
dard.
The defendants had conceded that, if they had actual knowledge of the discriminatory nature of the plaintiff’s classification and
had been deliberately indifferent to that discriminatory nature, they
119
would be subject to supervisory liability. Because of this concession,
120
the parties never argued the scope of supervisory liability. The parties in Iqbal agreed to a standard of supervisory liability and the Court,
sua sponte, unnecessarily decided that the scope was something
121
else.
When the majority addressed this issue, it noted that a subordinate is only liable for unconstitutional discrimination if the plaintiff
122
shows purpose, rather than mere knowledge. The Court noted that
supervisory officials are only responsible for their own misconduct

117

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
(emphasis added).
118
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956.
119
Id.
120
Id. Justice Souter noted the “danger of ‘bad decisionmaking’ when the briefing on a question is ‘woefully inadequate’” and pointed out that in Iqbal, the Court
did not receive any briefing on this issue. Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 225 (2009)). Justice Souter continued to express
his concern regarding the unfairness that this decision had on Iqbal who detrimentally relied on his adversary’s concession and was not given the proper opportunity to
brief the issue being decided. Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1949 (majority opinion).
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because there is no vicarious liability under a Bivens claim.
Additionally, the Court concluded that because a subordinate is only liable upon a showing of purpose to discriminate, a supervisory official
is only liable for unconstitutional discrimination if the plaintiff shows
purpose to discriminate rather than mere knowledge of the subordi124
nate’s discriminatory intentions.
The Court was deciding whether
it was permissible for the subordinate’s mental state to transfer to the
supervisory official. The Court was not deciding whether all Bivens
claims require a showing that the supervisory official purposefully intended for a constitutional violation to occur. As the majority opinion stated, “The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will
125
vary with the constitutional provision at issue.”
B. The Language of the Iqbal Ruling.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted at several points
126
that “purpose rather than knowledge” is the requisite factor.
This
reference, however, is never made without a qualifying statement that
127
the requirement is for an unconstitutional discrimination claim.
The importance of these quotes in context is that the Court never
made any broad statements declaring a need for purpose or intent,
but rather the majority limited the requirement of purpose or intent
to those claims based on First or Fifth Amendment violations of discrimination.
In line with the limitations of the language in the Iqbal decision,
this Comment accepts the interpretation that the scope of the Iqbal
123

Id.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948–49.
125
Id. at 1948.
126
See id. at 1947–49.
127
See, e.g., id. at 1947 (“We begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled to assert
the defense of qualified immunity.”) (emphasis added); id. at 1948 (“The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue. Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth
Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the
defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”) (emphasis added); id. at 1948–49 (“It
follows that, to state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established right, respondent must plead sufficient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and
implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason
but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.”)
(emphasis added); id. at 1949 (“In the context of determining whether there is a violation of a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather
than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendant responsibilities.”) (emphasis added).
124

GRACE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

336

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/9/2012 5:22 PM

[Vol. 42:317

decision is limited to intent-based claims. Contrary to Justice Souter’s
dissent, the requirement that the supervisory official’s mental state
mirror that required by the underlying constitutional violation logically follows from the established principle that there is no vicarious
liability for government officials. Without vicarious liability, the subordinate’s faults are not imputed to the supervisor and, consequently,
the supervisory official must satisfy the requirements of supervisory
liability in order to be personally liable.
In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a discrimination claim, the
Court had previously held that the discriminatory policy or statute
must be implemented “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’” its ad128
verse effects upon an identifiable group.” Thus, the foundation of
the claim would be undermined if a supervisor were not required to
meet that same mental element because the supervisor would then be
held to a lower standard—vicarious liability. This interpretation appropriately balances the desire to hold supervisory officials liable to
deter future constitutional violations and compensate victims of violations, while still protecting government officials from endless personal liability. Consequently, it is appropriate to conclude that Iqbal’s
elimination of the possibility that “knowledge and acquiescence”
could satisfy the personal involvement requirement of supervisory
liability is limited to intent-based claims.
Likewise, given the limited nature of the Iqbal decision, the interpretation that the scope is narrowed by the presence of exigent
circumstances is also a feasible one. The idea that certain situations
require impulsive decisions and should not be evaluated in the same
manner as those that result from extensive planning and deliberation
129
is an established concept for the Court.
The Court might have
been more hesitant to hold Ashcroft and Mueller liable for the policies that they implemented while they were trying to avoid another
terrorist attack in the wake of September 11th. In the context of a
national emergency “unprecedented in the history of the American
130
republic,” the Court may have felt additionally compelled to pro-

128

Personal Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
See, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852 (1998) (requiring
purpose to harm rather than deliberate indifference because “‘a deliberate indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of such competing obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second
chance’” (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986))).
130
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 178–79) (Cabranes,
C.J., concurring).
129
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vide protection to high-level officials from liability. That being said,
the impact of the Court’s decision does not rest on national security
interests.
Under this analysis of the Iqbal decision, the best interpretation
is that it impacted the supervisory liability standard by clarifying the
requisite mental state that a plaintiff must plead in order for a supervisory official to be held personally liable for the constitutional violations of his or her subordinates. Before Iqbal, there was no set standard, and courts implemented different requirements. Some courts
132
required recklessness, others required only a showing of knowledge
133
and acquiescence, and one court permitted the imposition of liabil134
ity upon only a showing of gross negligence by the supervisor.
Now, post-Iqbal, the supervisor’s mental state must reflect the
mental state that the underlying constitutional violation sets forth.
Namely, for a First or Fifth Amendment violation, a claimant must
show that the supervisor had the requisite purpose or intent to cause
135
the violation; for a Fourth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must
136
show that the supervisor was objectively unreasonable; and for an
Eighth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must show that the super137
visor acted recklessly towards the individual’s constitutional rights.
In sum, the most plausible reading of the Iqbal decision in the context of supervisory liability is that the mental state of the supervisor
must mirror that of the subordinate. The ruling that “knowledge and
acquiescence” will no longer suffice to establish personal involvement
was limited to intent-based claims because mere knowledge of an underling’s discrimination is not proof that the supervisor himself had
the invidious intent to discriminate.
Intent-based claims, like those presented in Iqbal, rightfully require intent on the part of the supervisor. There are, however, a host
131

While the language of the decision insinuates that the more plausible interpretation is that the ruling was limited to intent-based claims, the Court’s reluctance to
impose personal liability on Ashcroft and Mueller is almost certainly relevant to the
national security interests at the center of these policy decisions. Specifically, the
Court was likely motivated to reach the outcome it did because of a concern for the
exigent circumstances that surrounded Ashcroft and Mueller’s decision-making responsibilities.
132
E.g., Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006); Estate
of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005).
133
E.g., Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1001 (7th Cir. 2003); Doe v.
City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 2002).
134
Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002).
135
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976).
136
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
137
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994).
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of standards for other violations and the required mental element
should mirror that of the underlying violation. This requirement, in
addition to the required showing of the supervisor’s personal in138
volvement, sufficiently shields government officials from respondeat superior.
IV. THE PROPER STANDARD FOR SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
The doctrine of supervisory liability is complex and multifaceted.
As a result, there is a significant need for a clear and uniform standard for all courts throughout the country to apply consistently. Uniformity throughout jurisdictions is necessary because of situations—
such as the one in Iqbal—in which the government official is in such a
high position that he oversees subordinates throughout the United
States. By adopting one set standard, the Supreme Court would enable government officials to conform their conduct to the established
requirements, such that officials would not fear the ramifications of
inconsistent personal liability standards throughout the country.
After analyzing several variations of the standard for supervisory
liability, this Comment suggests a two-prong test that will sufficiently
balance the interests of the government officials and those of individual citizens. Government officials aim to avoid liability for the de139
cisions they make within the scope of their official roles. Similarly,
courts seek to compensate victims of constitutional violations and induce high-level officials to more thoroughly implement and oversee
140
policies that eliminate the occurrence of these violations.
Given
these concerns, this Comment’s two-prong test requires: (1) a showing of personal involvement on the part of the supervisor, and (2) a
showing of the requisite mental state that is derived from the underly141
ing constitutional violation at issue.
These requirements are not new concepts to the doctrine of supervisory liability. Rather, courts have consistently used these concepts, and the Iqbal decision reiterated their existence. This Comment suggests a test that will clarify and explain these longstanding
principles. In Dunlop v. Monroe, a case from 1812, the Supreme Court
first introduced the idea that, in order to be liable, a supervisor must
142
be personally involved in the underlying wrongdoing.
In Dunlop,

138
139
140
141
142

See discussion infra Part V.
See Kinports, supra note 40, at 1293–94.
Id. at 1294.
This second prong reflects the ruling from Iqbal.
11 U.S. 242 (1812).
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the Court determined the circumstances under which a postmaster
143
would be liable for his subordinate’s errors. While this case was decided two hundred years ago, its holding is consistent with current
144
145
case law and was cited by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
Essentially, the Court held that the postmaster must be personally in146
volved in his subordinate’s wrongdoing.
According to the Court,
the alleged failure-to-supervise claim could feasibly satisfy the personal involvement requirement so long as the plaintiff alleged that the
postmaster affirmatively failed to supervise, presumably either with
knowledge of the subordinate’s errors or with some type of an affir147
mative duty to do so. Based on this rationale, the Court held that a
plaintiff could not simply allege that the postmaster was the supervisor of the subordinate who caused the violation and that he was con148
sequently liable merely due to his supervisory position alone. Thus,
by 1812, the Court had already established that respondeat superior
149
would be insufficient.
Regarding the required mental state, court decisions have varied
150
depending on the jurisdiction and the details of the violation, but
151
the significance of Iqbal is that it clarifies this prong. Now, regardless of the jurisdiction, in order for a supervisor to be liable for the
violations of his or her subordinates, the plaintiff must show that the
supervisor’s mental state mirrored that of the subordinate—the mental state derived from the relevant constitutional provision that forms
152
the basis of the claim. This outcome is completely in line with the

143

Id. at 244.
See, e.g., Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional violation, but personal involvement is not limited solely to situations where a defendant violates a plaintiff’s rights by physically placing hands on
him.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
145
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
146
Dunlop, 11 U.S. at 269.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See id.
150
See, e.g., Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006);
Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1001 (7th Cir. 2003); Poe v. Leonard,
282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002).
151
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (“The factors necessary to
establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue. Where
the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”).
152
See id.
144
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theory that there is no vicarious liability for government officials—the
subordinate’s guilty mind is not imputed to the supervisor.
In conducting this analysis, it is important to note that the requirement of personal involvement and the requisite mental element
153
are often conflated. Some courts have concluded that a showing of
knowledge and acquiescence or deliberate indifference alone will sa154
tisfy the supervisory liability standard.
This Comment rejects that
contention on the basis that it does not sufficiently protect a government official’s interests in avoiding liability simply for being in an au155
thoritative position. Knowledge and acquiescence as well as deliberate indifference may satisfy the personal involvement prong, but the
required mental state is also necessary in order to fully satisfy the supervisory liability standard.
The test that this Comment proposes first requires a showing
that the supervisory official was personally involved in the violation
and second, that he or she exhibited the required mental state in regards to the violation. To clarify the first requirement, this Comment
now directly addresses the Court’s language of a “personal involvement” requirement and clarifies what types of acts can satisfy this
prong. In order to do this, it is useful to analyze pre-Iqbal case law.
Even though Iqbal makes clear that a plaintiff must show that the
high-level official had some personal involvement with the subordinate’s actions, courts are still unclear as to what personal involvement
156
means.
Some courts have interpreted personal involvement nar157
rowly, essentially requiring direct involvement. Based on the policy
rationale behind supervisory liability, this cannot be a correct application of the personal involvement requirement because personal in158
volvement is not synonymous with direct contact. As a policy matter, this would mean that high-level officials would be permitted to
implement intentionally discriminatory policies and avoid liability by
simply requiring that their subordinates follow them through. So
153

See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989).
See id.
155
See supra Part III.
156
See Arias v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of the Dep’t. of
Homeland Sec., No. 07-1959, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61519, at *9–10 (D. Minn. July
17, 2009) (holding that high-level government officials are personally liable only
when they have direct involvement with the individual plaintiffs or when a failure to
supervise or train causes the deprivation of constitutional rights).
157
See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207–08 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that personal involvement can only be satisfied by personal direction or, in limited
circumstances, with particularized assertions, knowledge and acquiescence).
158
See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010).
154
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long as those high officials never left their offices and never had direct contact with any of the individuals whose rights were violated by
the policies, they would never be personally liable under a §1983 or
Bivens claim. As a policy matter, this cannot be correct.
A. Prior Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court addressed personal involvement in the supervisory liability context on several occasions prior to Iqbal. In understanding the current state of the personal involvement requirement and the evolution of the supervisory liability standard generally,
it is helpful to outline those major cases that led up to Iqbal.
First, in Rizzo v. Goode, plaintiffs brought two class actions against
Philadelphia’s mayor, the city’s managing director, and supervisory
159
police officials. The plaintiffs sought equitable relief for an allegedly pervasive pattern of unconstitutional police mistreatment of city
160
The District Court
residents, in particular the minority citizens.
held the defendants liable because of their failure to act in the face of
161
the statistical pattern of misconduct.
The court entered an order
that required the implementation of a new program designed to pre162
163
vent future misconduct, and the Third Circuit affirmed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the evidence on the
record did not establish that the named defendants had implemented any policy to violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff
164
classes. The lower court had found that there was evidence of a departmental procedure indicating a tendency to discourage the filing
of civilian complaints and to minimize the consequences of police
165
misconduct. The Supreme Court, however, held that the violators
of the named plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were individual police
166
officers not named in the action. In regard to the supervisory officials, the Court held that there was no affirmative link between a plan
or policy implemented by the defendants and the violations that the
167
plaintiffs endured.
The “affirmative link” language seemingly be-

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976).
Id. at 366–67.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 364.
Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev’d 423 U.S. 362.
Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 375.
Id. at 368–69.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 371.
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came the foundation of the causation requirement and the personal
involvement requirement that would evolve in later cases.
In Rizzo, the named defendants were merely in supervisory positions and did not exhibit any personal involvement with the individu168
al plaintiffs’ violations.
The district court concluded that “even
without a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a small
percentage of the police force, petitioner’s failure to act in the face of
a statistical pattern is indistinguishable from the active conduct” in
169
previous case law. The Supreme Court rejected this possibility and
required that supervisory officials only be held liable for their own con170
duct.
Thus, Rizzo established that an affirmative link must exist between the supervisor and the violation. If a plaintiff aims to show a
“failure to act” to satisfy the personal involvement prong, the Rizzo
Court declared that the existence of a statistical pattern of miscon171
duct is insufficient. Presumably, a plaintiff would need to show that
the supervisor had actual knowledge of the misconduct that was occurring and, despite that knowledge, failed to act.
The next major case to address the issue of supervisory liability
172
was City of Canton v. Harris.
In that case, the police arrested the
173
plaintiff and took her into custody.
Because she was continuously
falling over, the police asked if she needed medical attention; she re174
sponded incoherently.
Upon her release from custody one hour
later, the plaintiff’s family took her to the hospital where she was di175
agnosed with several emotional ailments. She was then hospitalized
for one week and thereafter completed outpatient treatment for a
176
year.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a § 1983 claim alleging that, under the municipal regulations, police shift commanders had sole discretion to determine if someone in custody needed medical atten-

168

Id. at 375.
Id. at 375–76 (discussing the underlying rationale of the district court opinion).
170
Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377 (distinguishing the factual situation of Rizzo v. Goode from
the previous decisions of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
171
Id. at 375–76.
172
489 U.S. 378 (1989).
173
Id. at 381.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
169
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178

tion.
The municipality, however, did not provide training to
those shift commanders to teach them how to make such determinations; thus, the municipal liability claim was based on a failure to
179
train.
The Supreme Court held that inadequacy of police training may
be the basis of § 1983 liability only when the failure to train amounts
to a deliberate indifference to the rights of people with whom the po180
lice might come in contact. In order for an action to amount to deliberate indifference, “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . [must be] made from among various alternatives by city
policymakers . . . [and] [o]nly where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality” will the courts impose
181
liability.
This case is significant in the evolution of the supervisory liability
standard because it set out the basis for deliberate indifference as a
method of satisfying the personal involvement prong. In City of Canton, the Court determined that deliberate indifference was satisfied if
decision-makers had multiple choices and opted for the action that
182
created an obvious risk of resulting violations. In addition, this case
set out the relationship between the mental requirement and the act
requirement and demonstrated how easy it can be to conflate these
183
two distinct prongs.
The final case to analyze regarding the history of the supervisory
184
liability standard is Board of County Commissioners v. Brown. In Brown,
the plaintiff was injured after a police deputy pulled him out of a
185
truck following a police chase. The plaintiff based the § 1983 claim
on the county’s inadequate screening when it hired the deputy because the deputy had a conviction for assault and battery, as well as
186
other misdemeanor convictions.
The personal involvement prong
177

Id. at 381–82.
This case dealt with entity liability rather than liability of supervisory officials.
The Court previously held that a municipal entity is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, so the case law pertaining to § 1983 applies to entity liability. Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
179
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 382.
180
Note that an omission—a failure to act, supervise, or train—can satisfy the personal involvement prong. See id.
181
Id. at 389 (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483–84 (1986)).
182
See id.
183
See id.
184
520 U.S. 397(1997).
185
Id. at 399–400.
186
Id. at 401.
178
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was the failure to screen, while the hiring amounted to deliberate in187
difference.
In deciding whether liability attached, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that even if “inadequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would make a violation of rights more likely [, this] cannot
alone give rise to an inference that a policymaker’s failure to scrutinize the record of a particular applicant produced a specific constitu188
tional violation.” Thus, the Court held that a failure to screen constitutes deliberate indifference and consequently satisfies the
supervisory liability standard, but only in situations where the deprivation of constitutionally protected rights would be the unmistakably
189
obvious consequence of hiring the potential applicant. The Court
also stated that “[i]n any § 1983 suit, [the] plaintiff must establish the
190
state of mind required to prove the underlying violation.” This language strengthens the argument that Iqbal was not a groundbreaking
case for the doctrine of supervisory liability. Instead, the Iqbal language is similar, if not identical, to the language used in prior Supreme Court cases, including in City of Canton.
B. Prior Lower Court Decisions
In order to reach a clear and uniform standard for the personal
involvement prong of supervisory liability, the next step is to analyze
how lower courts have interpreted these Supreme Court decisions.
In general, jurisdictions differ in the type of actions they permit to sa191
tisfy the personal involvement requirement.
For example, the
Ninth Circuit has held that,
to be held liable, the supervisor need not be directly and personally involved in the same way as are the individual officers who
are on the scene inflicting constitutional injury. Rather, the supervisor’s participation could include his own culpable action or
inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates, his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which
the complaint is made, or conduct that showed a reckless or call192
ous indifference to the rights of others.

187

See id.
Id. at 410–11 (emphasis added).
189
See id.
190
Brown, 520 U.S. at 405.
191
See infra text accompanying notes 192–196.
192
Starr v. Baca, No. 09-55233, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15283, at *6 (9th Cir. July
25, 2011) (quoting Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991))(internal
quotation marks omitted).
188
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In contrast, the Third Circuit has held that personal involvement
is satisfied through allegations of (1) personal direction or (2) actual
193
knowledge and acquiescence.
This means that a supervisor would
be liable if he or she directly instructed a subordinate to do something that would cause a constitutional deprivation to the third party,
or if he or she actually knew that a subordinate was doing something
that would violate a third party’s constitutional rights and the supervi194
sory official acquiesced in that behavior.
Yet another standard exists in the Second Circuit, which has
held that “[i]t is well settled . . . that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an
195
award of damages under § 1983.’” The court has elaborated on the
requisite showing by stating that
the personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be
shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in
the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being
informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to
remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom
under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the
continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was
grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the
wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information in196
dicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

As noted by this analysis of relevant circuit court opinions, the
standard for satisfying the personal involvement prong varies significantly among the circuits. In striving for a uniform standard, it is necessary to set out an exhaustive list of actions that will satisfy the personal involvement prong of supervisory liability for courts in all
jurisdictions to apply. After analyzing the different variations, this
Comment will consolidate all of the relevant actions into three main
categories. Namely, a supervisory official would be deemed personally involved in the violation of an individual’s constitutional rights
when said official either (1) directly caused the constitutional viola-

193
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Zion v. Nassan, 727
F. Supp. 2d 388, 405–08 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Mincy v. McConnell, No. 09-236, 2010 WL
3092681, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2010); Liberty & Prosperity 1776, Inc. v. Corzine,
720 F. Supp. 2d 622, 628–30 (D.N.J. 2010); Bullock v. Beard, No. 3:10-cv-401, 2010
WL 1507228, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2010).
194
See Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353.
195
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Wright v. Smith,
21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)).
196
Id. (citing Wright, 21 F.3d at 501).
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tion, either through direct instruction or direct involvement; (2) was
deliberately indifferent to the rights of the victim; or (3) had knowledge of the subordinate’s conduct that caused the violation and acquiesced in said conduct.
As to the first means of satisfying the personal involvement requirement—directly depriving a third party of his or her constitutionally protected rights—the supervisory official may be liable even
197
without the doctrine of supervisory liability. Under these circumstances, a plaintiff might successfully bring a civil claim for a constitutional violation under § 1983 or Bivens generally without the need to
rely on the supervisory liability standard. Without direct participation, the plaintiff would still satisfy this requirement by showing that
the supervisory official directly instructed the subordinate.
In satisfying the second option—deliberate indifference—the
plaintiff must show that the supervisory official disregarded an ob198
vious consequence of his or her actions. Finally, to satisfy the third
option—knowledge and acquiescence—the plaintiff must show that
the supervisory official had knowledge of the violation or the potential for the violation and acquiesced in the subordinate’s conduct,
199
which then caused the violation. Presumably, most actions that are
typically alleged in supervisory liability cases would fall into one of
these three categories. For example, claims of failure to train, failure
to supervise, or failure to screen while hiring would fit under the deliberate indifference standard, so long as the supervisors acted recklessly. Similarly, failure to discipline or failure to remedy would fall
within the knowledge and acquiescence option. As a matter of policy,
it would be impractical for a supervisory official to avoid liability for
depriving an individual of constitutional rights simply because the
official was not present and solely responsible. Liability should attach
when supervisors set in motion a series of acts that ultimately cause
the violation.
As this Comment has now set up the ways in which a plaintiff can
satisfy the personal involvement prong, it is crucial to remember that
satisfying that prong is not dispositive for satisfying the supervisory
200
liability standard.
In addition, the plaintiff must sufficiently plead
201
the requisite mental state derived from the underlying violation.
197

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).
199
See, e.g., Womack v. Smith, No. 1:06-CV-2348, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120728, at
*13 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2009).
200
See supra text accompanying notes 139–42.
201
See id.
198
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Namely, the common mental state requirements include: intent or
202
purpose for First or Fifth Amendment claims, objective unreasona203
bleness for Fourth Amendment claims, and recklessness for Eighth
204
Amendment claims.
In sum, a plaintiff will satisfy the supervisory
liability standard only when both of the requisite prongs are sufficiently pled.
C. Implications of this Comment’s Proposed Test
This table demonstrates the implications of this Comment’s test
by setting out the requisite showing by a plaintiff seeking to succeed
205
on a claim of supervisory liability against a supervisory official.

First or Fifth
Amendment
Violations
(Purpose or
Intent Re206
quired)

Direct Causation

Deliberate Indifference

Officials are liable for di207
engaging in the
rectly
violating behavior with the
purpose to discriminate.

Officials are liable for
ignoring an obvious risk
208
of
or consequence
their actions with the
purpose to discriminate.

Knowledge and
Acquiescence
Officials are liable
for knowing that
subordinates are engaging in certain
behavior and ac209
in that
quiescing
behavior with the
210
purpose to discri211
minate.

202
See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–33,
540 (1993); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
203
See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
204
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1998).
205
Note that this table does not directly implicate the doctrine of qualified immunity. Consequently, a supervisory official within these situations could succeed on
a motion to dismiss under qualified immunity if he or she could show that the law
governing his or her actions was not clearly established or that a reasonable official
in his or her position would have considered his or her conduct to be lawful. See
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
206
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
207
By directly engaging in the violating conduct, this could mean that their role as
supervisors is essentially irrelevant. In these situations, they are directly responsible,
rather than being responsible in the context of their decision-making authority.
Another action that falls within this category would be directly instructing a subordinate to do something that causes a violation (i.e., directing a subordinate police officer to conduct an unlawful search).
208
A commonly cited example of a supervisor ignoring an obvious risk is a failure
to train police officers in the use of firearms.
209
Common examples of knowledge and acquiescence include when supervisors
are aware of certain issues and fail to discipline those subordinates that are responsible or fail to remedy their policies or practices.
210
Note that this is undoubtedly an issue for pleading because a plaintiff must
plead, without simply making conclusory statements, that the supervisory officials intended their policies or actions to result in constitutional violations of third parties.
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Officials are liable for directly conducting the objectively
unreasonable
search or seizure.

Officials are liable for
ignoring an obvious risk
or consequence of their
actions and they were
objectively unreasonable
in acting in such a manner.

Officials are liable for directly engaging in the violating behavior—namely
causing the cruel and unusually behavior – and
doing so in a reckless
manner.

Officials are liable for
recklessly ignoring an
obvious risk or consequence of their actions.

[Vol. 42:317
Officials are liable
for knowing that
subordinates are engaging in certain
behavior and acquiescing in that
behavior when doing
so is objectively unreasonable.
Officials are liable
for knowing that
subordinates are engaging in certain
behavior and recklessly acquiescing in
that behavior.

In applying the test put forth in this Comment, a plaintiff may
succeed on a claim for a First or Fifth Amendment violation upon a
showing that the supervisory defendant was directly involved in the
violation and acted in the manner alleged with the purpose or intent
to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Alternatively, the plaintiff may show that the supervisory official purposefully ignored an obvious risk or consequence that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights
would be violated, with the intent to cause such a violation. Finally, a
plaintiff may succeed on a First or Fifth Amendment claim by showing that the supervisory official had knowledge of the subordinate’s
improper conduct and acquiesced in said conduct with the purpose
or intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Similarly, to succeed on a Fourth Amendment violation claim,
the plaintiff may show that the supervisory official directly caused the
violation and acted objectively unreasonably in doing so. Alternatively, the plaintiff may show that the supervisory official was objectively
211
This is the situation from Iqbal, in which the allegation was that Ashcroft and
Mueller had knowledge of the discriminatory conduct occurring—deeming certain
suspects “high interest” and subjecting them to harsher conditions of confinement—
and acquiesced in the subordinates’ conduct by creating this policy of investigation
and incarceration and allowing the policy to continue. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1944 (2009). Iqbal likely satisfied the personal involvement prong by showing
that the supervisory officials had knowledge of, and acquiesced in, the violating conduct. See id. What he failed to do was satisfy the requisite-mental-state prong by
showing that Ashcroft and Mueller acquiesced in the violating behavior with the
purpose to discriminate. See id. Note that this requirement is in line with Washington
v. Davis, which explicitly states that discrimination claims will only succeed if the
challenged statute was implemented “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” the discriminatory effect. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Thus, while Iqbal did not deal with a statute,
the same can be said of the policy. See id.
212
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
213
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994).
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unreasonable in ignoring an obvious risk or consequence that the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights would be violated. Finally, the plaintiff
may succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim by showing that the supervisory official had knowledge of, and acquiesced in, the subordinate’s improper conduct that caused the violation, and that acquiescing in said conduct was objectively unreasonable.
Lastly, to succeed on an Eighth Amendment violation claim, the
plaintiff may show that the official was reckless in directly causing the
violation. Alternatively, the plaintiff may show that the supervisory
official recklessly ignored an obvious risk or consequence resulting in
the violation of plaintiff’s rights. Finally, a plaintiff may succeed on
an Eighth Amendment claim upon a showing that the supervisory
official knew of, and recklessly acquiesced in, behavior that violated
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court stated that “the term ‘supervisory
214
liability’ is a misnomer.” Many courts and scholars alike have interpreted this opinion to mean that supervisory liability was abolished or
that supervisors are liable only when they meet the same standards
215
that subordinates are required to meet. For both practical and policy reasons, this cannot be an accurate reading of the Iqbal decision.
To be a misnomer is to be misnamed. The term “supervisory liability,” on its face, implies the assumption of liability simply by means of
being a supervisor. In this regard, the term is a misnomer. Rather
than being liable simply for being a high-level official, supervisors are
liable only under certain circumstances.
Iqbal clarified and confirmed that one requirement for said circumstances is that a plaintiff must show that the supervisor exhibited
the requisite mental state as established by the underlying constitu216
tional violation.
As noted in Iqbal, but established quite clearly in
previous Supreme Court case law, the other requirement is that the
supervisor be personally involved in the deprivation of the constitutionally protected rights.
Based on several circuits’ analyses of the personal involvement
requirement, an appropriate uniform standard of supervisory liability
includes three potential means of satisfying that prong: (1) a showing
that the supervisory official directly caused the constitutional viola214
215
216

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 37.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; see discussion supra Part III.
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tion firsthand, (2) a showing that the supervisory official was deliberately indifferent to the risk of the constitutional violation, or (3) a
showing that the supervisory official had knowledge of the behavior
causing the violation and acquiesced in that behavior. Likewise, to
meet the supervisory liability standard, the satisfaction of one of the
three enumerated personal involvement showings must be accompanied by the requisite mental state for the particular constitutional
217
claim at hand.
In sum, Iqbal was not a groundbreaking decision regarding the
standard for supervisory liability. Rather, Iqbal merely clarified that in
order to satisfy the supervisory liability standard, the supervisor’s requisite mental state must be derived from the underlying constitutional claim. In addition to the mental state requirement clarified in
Iqbal, Supreme Court case law indicates, and Iqbal confirmed, that
218
there is a personal involvement requirement as well. Based on the
standard that this Comment sets out, a plaintiff must meet both requirements in order to succeed on a § 1983 or Bivens claim. With the
confusion in the wake of the Iqbal decision, society demands clarification, and with the high stakes and pertinent policy implications of
that clarification, society demands a comprehensible, uniform standard like the one put forth in this Comment.

217
218

See discussion supra Part. IV.C.
See, e.g., Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507 (1888).

